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1 Introduction 
Natural language requires the computational operation that can build hierarchical structures 
in a recursive fashion, thus providing the ability to produce and comprehend an unbounded 
number of sentences. Yet this is not enough: another computational operation is needed that 
can establish dependencies between positions in the sentence, thus providing information 
crucial for interpretation. Various dependencies exist between the elements of sentences, so 
that the relationships between words and phrases is constrained in a particular way. 
Dependencies include, amongst others, anaphora, case, and wh-dependencies. Wh-
dependencies are an example of long-distance ﬁller-gap dependencies, where the wh-word 
at the beginning of the sentence can be arbitrarily far away from the theta-role assigning 
element (a verb in the case of (1) and (2)) later in the sentence that selects the wh-word or 
phrase as a semantic argument.  !
(1) What does Jude think that Clayton saw _? 
(2) What does Jane think that the audience expects her to perform _ for her recital? !
	 In other words, when the wh-phrase (the ﬁller) is fronted to the beginning of the 
sentence, it leaves a gap (represented by an underscore above) where speakers of the 
language expect the argument to be. Like all dependencies, wh-dependencies exemplify the 
near ubiquitous displacement feature of natural languages in which linguistic elements are 
pronounced in sentential positions that are diﬀerent from the positions in which they receive 
their interpretation. So in (1) the wh-word what must be interpreted as being part of the 
argument structure of the verb saw, which is its thematic object, but what is pronounced in a 
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position that can be indeﬁnitely far away from the verb. Since wh-dependencies can be 
arbitrarily far apart (as is evident in (3) and (4) below), they are not constrained by length. !
(3) What does Lilly believe that Jude thinks that Clayton saw _? 
(4) What does Peter know that Lilly believes that Jude thinks that Clayton saw _? 
	  
However, when we investigate sentences such as (5), (6), and (7),  it becomes clear that long-1
distance dependencies are constrained in a structural way that has li]le to do with length or 
linear order. Words or phrases can be displaced within the sentence, leaving the canonical 
position empty, but there are certain domains within sentences out of which displacement 
will result in unacceptable or ungrammatical sentences. Ross (1967) called these domains 
islands, explaining that the words or phrases are in a sense stuck on that portion of the 
sentence, for certain syntactic operations cannot cross island boundaries and apply to those 
words or phrases. The wh-word in (5), (6), and (7) was moved out of an island, but that is 
not a legitimate grammatical operation and thus the result is an unacceptable sentence. !
(5) *What do you wonder [CP whether Jude bought _]? 
(6) *What did you make [NP the claim that Jude bought _]? 
(7) *What do you think [NP the speech about _] interrupted the broadcast? !
	 The interest in island eﬀects is not merely that they exist, for a complete description 
of every island eﬀect is just that: a description and not an explanation. The deeper 
explanatory question is why islands should exist in the ﬁrst place. Moreover, it is revealing 
to ask why the particular islands that we observe obtain and not some others. Such 
questions should be at the heart of any research program seeking to explain why the 
architecture of the language faculty is the way it is. The investigation of islands is subsumed 
under the study of locality, which studies the principles that limit the space within which 
syntactic operations can apply. Locality refers to structural locality, rather than the locality of 
adjacent words or the relative distance of particular phrases from other phrases in a linear 
string. As Rizzi (2013) discusses, locality cannot merely be a ma]er of linear contiguity. 
Consider agreement in sentences such as This picture of her dear parents pleases Mary, where 
the verb pleases does not agree with the linearly contiguous noun parents, but rather with the 
head of the subject noun phrase picture, which is a linearly more distant noun but is “closer” 
when one considers the hierarchical structure of the sentence.  See (8) below for a simpliﬁed 2
illustration. !
(8) [S [NP [NP [D This] [N picture]] [PP [P of] [NP [N her] [AdjP [Adj dear] [N parents]]]]] [VP [V 
pleases] [N Mary]]] !
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 Adapted from Sprouse and Hornstein (2013).1
 See Lasnik and Uriagereka (2012) for more on structural distance.2
   !
	 Wh-islands are not by any means the only sort of island eﬀect, for there are many 
syntactic environments in which long distance dependencies are blocked. Moreover, island 
phenomena are ubiquitous in every studied language and computational constraints of this 
sort appear to be universal (see Boeckx 2012; Phillips 2013; 2013a). Consider another 
example, discussed in Ross (1967: 247ﬀ.), the classic work on islands: in (9) the noun phrase 
(NP) the boy’s cannot be relativised to produce (10). !
(9) I disliked the boy’s playing the piano loudly. 
(10) *The boy whose playing the piano loudly I disliked was a student. !
However, the object NP of playing in (9), the piano, can be relativised to produce (11). !
(11) The piano which I disliked the boy’s playing loudly was badly out of tune. !
The explanation of the diﬀerence between (10) and (11) is that (10) is a violation of an island 
constraint and is thus an unacceptable English sentence. Ross (1967: 243) called this the 
Sentential Subject Constraint, according to which no element dominated by an S may be 
moved out of that S if that S is dominated by an NP which itself is immediately dominated 
by S. In other words, clausal subjects are islands and so nothing can be moved out of clausal 
subjects. So in (9), the NP the boy’s cannot be moved because the NP within which it is 
contained (the boy’s playing the piano loudly) is dominated by an S. There is thus an island 
boundary that bars the movement of the NP the boy’s. See (12) for a simpliﬁed illustration. !
(12) [S [NP I] [VP [V disliked] [NP [S [NP the boy’s] [VP [V playing] [NP the piano] [AdvP loudly]]]]] !
   !
 3
	 Note that even though (10) is ungrammatical, we can easily understand the sentence, 
for it is an instance of a perfectly thinkable thought. That is, the content of (10) can be easily 
grasped and paraphrased but a]empting to express it in that way makes it ungrammatical. 
There are countless cases of island violations of every kind that are easily interpretable but 
yet are judged to be ungrammatical. Perfectly thinkable thoughts will be discussed further in 
section 5; for now, they can be understood as the interpretable structures generated by the 
computational procedures of I-language. I argue below that the existence of perfectly 
thinkable thoughts suggests that island phenomena are due to interface conditions, as 
opposed to being constraints on structure generation or due to performance limitations. 
That is, if language is an instrument of thought as has been argued by various authors in the 
biolinguistics tradition (Hinzen 2006; 2013; Chomsky 2013; 2013a; Asoulin 2016), then a 
uniquely human subset of thoughts must be generated in narrow syntax, which suggests 
that island constraints and the ungrammatical sentences they cause cannot be rooted in 
narrow syntax alone. This is because speakers must be able to mentally represent thoughts 
whose expression in sound/sign nevertheless violates island constraints. If islands were due 
to constraints on structure generation alone then that would leave unexplained perfectly 
thinkable thoughts. That is, it would leave unexplained why certain structures that have 
been generated are ungrammatical due to island constraints and yet their meaning is 
perfectly understandable. If we take interpretable structures to be generated by narrow 
syntax and then explain their grammaticality or unacceptability in terms of interface 
relations, then this explains why we are able to interpret sentences with island violations. In 
other words, the existence of perfectly thinkable thoughts provides independent support for 
the claim that islands reﬂect interface conditions imposed on the output of the 
computational system and its mapping to external systems. 
	 There are, broadly speaking, three types of explanations that have been oﬀered for 
why islands exist. These are (i) that islands are a result of performance (memory or 
processing) limitations that constrain how linguistic knowledge is put to use, (ii) that islands 
reﬂect certain constraints on structure generation in narrow syntax, and (iii) that islands 
reﬂect interface conditions imposed on the output of the computational system and its 
mapping to external systems. I discuss each in turn in the following three sections. In the 
ﬁnal section I suggest that we have independent reasons to believe that islands are best 
explained in terms of interface conditions. I argue that islands are interface phenomena 
having to do with the conversion by the sensorimotor interface of hierarchical structures to 
linear ones. This has to do with the understanding of language as an instrument of thought, 
speciﬁcally that the underlying mechanisms of language make possible a particular kind of 
thought that is uniquely human. Humans share with animals many kinds of cognitive 
processes, but there is a uniquely human kind that is rooted in the underlying mechanisms 
of language. I discuss what implications this has for the explanation of why syntactic islands 
should exist. !
2 Islands are a result of performance limitations 
Reductionist accounts a]empt to explain island phenomena in terms of independently 
motivated properties of language processing or other cognitive mechanisms. Following 
Phillips (2013), one should distinguish between such reductionist accounts and what he 
terms grounded accounts of syntactic phenomena. These two accounts are separate but are 
too often equivocated. As Boeckx (2012: 27-28) puts it, grounded accounts “do not deny the 
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existence of grammatical constraints. What they do is oﬀer a rationale for them in terms of 
extra-grammatical considerations.” That is, “they make roughly the same kind of 
(synchronic) empirical predictions as standard grammatical accounts.” Grounded accounts 
share with formal accounts the working assumption that syntactic constraints are mentally 
represented, but grounded accounts have a diﬀerent explanation for the origin of these 
constraints. Hawkins (1999), for example, argues that the diﬃculty in processing ﬁller-gap 
dependencies is directly reﬂected in the conventions of grammars. So, on this account, even 
though syntactic constraints are real and mentally represented, their ultimate source is due 
to the processing aspects of the parser shaping what the grammars allow or disallow as 
acceptable structures.  In other words, on the grounded account syntactic constraints are 3
real formal restrictions that reduce language processing diﬃculty because they arose for that 
very purpose. 
	 This is not so with reductionist accounts, which take islands to be a ma]er of 
performance, not competence. Hofmeister and Sag (2010: 379), for example, argue that once 
the processing burdens on islands “are properly understood (and explained partly in terms 
of semantic and pragmatic factors), there remains li]le work to be done by purely syntactic 
island constraints.” They object to what they see as the consensus in the ﬁeld according to 
which, even though the full set of island data cannot be explained in purely syntactic terms, 
“there remains a strong bias toward treating as much of the data as possible in purely 
syntactic terms.” Performance-based accounts claim that island phenomena are the 
byproducts of general principles of cognition. The claim is that speakers judge sentences 
with island eﬀects as unacceptable not because of grammatical constraints but rather 
because of some overburden on the language processing system. Pritche] (1991) is one of 
the earliest of such accounts. He argues that island sentences are grammatical but 
unprocessable. That is, island constraints can be “shown to exceed the capacity of the human 
sentence processor to perform certain structural analyses during parsing” (Pritche] 1991: 
302). Speciﬁcally, Pritche] argues that island eﬀects are a type of garden path sentence (e.g., 
(13) and (14) below) that result from the combination of (a) “local parsing decisions that 
ultimately prove not to be consonant with a global grammatical representation” and (b) “the 
parser's inability to perform the structural reanalyses necessary to obtain a grammatical 
representation” (Pritche] 1991: 304). In other words, the “initial incorrect parsing decision is 
frequently, but not necessarily, the result of a local ambiguity in the input string”, and so 
garden path sentences (and island eﬀects) “are the result of unrecoverable parsing 
errors” (Pritche] 1991: 304). !
(13) The horse raced past the barn fell. 
(14) The doctor persuaded the patient he was having trouble with to leave. !
	 More recently, Hofmeister and colleagues (Hofmeister & Sag 2010; Hofmeister et al. 
2013; building on the work of Deane 1991; Kluender 1992; 1998; Kluender & Kutas 1993) 
have argued that factors independently tied to processing diﬃculty can also aﬀect the 
acceptability of island constructions. Hofmeister and Sag (2010) discuss psycholinguistic 
research showing that processing load increases inside a syntactic dependency and also 
increases as the dependency gets longer. They also discuss separate psycholinguistic 
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 For other grounded accounts see Fodor (1974) and Berwick and Weinberg (1984).3
research showing that the diﬃculty of processing ﬁller-gap dependencies is contingent on 
the properties of the ﬁller itself. So, for example, a “wealth of memory research shows that 
elaboration or increased semantic processing during the study phase of recall tasks beneﬁts 
subsequent retrieval of isolated words and propositions” – the retrieval of these words and 
propositions aids in making the correct syntactic dependencies across phrases and lessens 
parsing errors. Their claim is that this “memory-based account thus oﬀers one means for 
explaining why semantically richer, more complex ﬁller phrases promote increased 
acceptability” (Hofmeister & Sag 2010: 384). Presumably, then, the more information of this 
kind the parser has at its disposal, the easier it will be able to process any given sentence. In 
a way not dissimilar to that of Pritche] (1991), Hofmeister and Sag note that semantically 
richer ﬁller phrases reduce the chances of garden-pathing. After discussing other factors 
independently tied to processing diﬃculty, Hofmeister and Sag present their own 
experiments that manipulate the aforementioned variables to test whether they have any 
eﬀect on the acceptability of island constructions. They argue that there are numerous 
processing pressures that aggregate during sentence comprehension; when the processing 
diﬃculty goes beyond a threshold, unacceptability is often the result. They conclude that 
“the performance-based view accounts for islands as the byproduct of general principles of 
cognition” (Hofmeister & Sag 2010: 403-404). 
	 This general claim is qualiﬁed in a number of places: for example, they say that “it 
may well be the case, as already noted, that certain island phenomena are best explained via 
syntactic constraints, while others may be be]er and more easily reconciled with processing-
based considerations” (Hofmeister & Sag 2010: 405). They also admit that researchers 
favouring the formal grammatical explanation of islands accept that some performance 
factors should play a part in the explanation of island phenomena. If both sides agree that 
performance and formal factors should play a role, where does that leave the debate? On one 
side of the debate there is a push to explain as much as possible in terms of formal 
constraints, and on the other side there is a push to explain as much as possible in terms of 
processing-based considerations. In regard to the la]er, one can of course propose any 
number of ways in which the processing costs of building long-distance dependencies 
interact with the processing of island structures, but currently the only theory that contains a 
mechanism to explain the supposed superadditive eﬀects of processing islands is that of 
Kluender and Kutas (1993) and variants and elaborations thereof (such as Hofmeister & Sag 
2010). As noted above, this mechanism in eﬀect sets a threshold beyond which the 
processing system runs out of resource capacity, namely that of working memory.  
	 Sprouse et al. (2012) argue that the main diﬀerence between reductionist theories and 
their competitors lies in the role of working memory capacity. That is, according to the 
reductionist approach the superadditive eﬀect is due to limits on working memory, whereas 
on the grammatical account working memory is not part of the explanation. We can thus use 
working memory, which is the only mechanism proposed to account for the supposed 
superadditive eﬀects of processing islands, in order to test the empirical predictions of both 
accounts. Thus, the “reductionist theory would predict a correlation between the size of the 
limited pool of resources and the size of the resulting island eﬀects. The grammatical theory 
predicts no such correlation” (Sprouse et al. 2012: 90). Sprouse et al. carried out two studies 
to test whether the strength of island eﬀects varied across speakers as a function of 
individual diﬀerences in working memory resources. They found no evidence supporting 
the predictions made by reductionist theories. As they put it, their “results are consistent 
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with grammatical theories of island eﬀects, which predict no relation between resource 
capacity and the strength of island eﬀects” (Sprouse et al. 2012: 118). Moreover, “the known 
facts of working-memory tasks suggest that the likelihood of ﬁnding such a relationship 
[between island eﬀects and resource capacity] with diﬀerent tasks or a diﬀerent sample is 
extremely small” (Sprouse et al. 2012: 118).  !
3 Islands reﬂect computational constraints 
So the reductionist account remains controversial, and as reductionists themselves readily 
admit there are certain core island phenomena that are perhaps best explained by syntactic 
constraints. Let us now look at the syntactic account, which has its roots in Chomsky (1973), 
according to which islands reﬂect certain computational constraints on grammatical 
operations (see Chomsky 2001; 2008; 2013a for recent versions). That is, for computations to 
be eﬃcient they should apply mostly locally within speciﬁc domains; in regard to syntactic 
computations, these domains correspond to islands. If this is so, then island eﬀects can be 
explained as the by-products of (presumably language-independent) principles that 
guarantee eﬃcient computation. In order to understand the nature of the computational 
constraints that lead to islands, let us brieﬂy sketch the generative procedures and 
computations inherent in I-languages. 
	 An I-language is the computational system in the mind of individual language users. 
It is a generative procedure that can output all and only the strings of a particular language. 
The “I”, of course, refers to the internal but also to the intensional nature of particular I-
languages, meaning that there is a speciﬁc procedure encoded in the mind that generates the 
strings; this is in contrast to the extensional nature of E-language grammars (Chomsky 
1986). Another way to put the ma]er is in terms of formal mathematics, in which a sequence 
can be deﬁned extensionally by listing its members, say {0, 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13…}, or 
intensionally by providing a formula that can generate all and only the members of the 
sequence, say the formula Fn = Fn-1 + Fn-2 that generates all and only the numbers of the 
Fibonacci sequence. An intensional deﬁnition is much more useful for large sets and is 
essential for potentially inﬁnite sets like the ones associated with natural languages. The 
internal computational processes of the language faculty generate linguistic objects that are 
employed by the conceptual-intentional systems (systems of thought) and the sensorimotor 
systems. Lexical items, then, and all expressions generated from them, must have properties 
that are interpretable at both these interfaces. Notice that on this view the language faculty is 
embedded within, but separate from, the performance systems. So an I-language is a device 
that generates structured expressions of the form Exp = 〈Phon, Sem〉, where Phon provides the 
sound instructions of which the sensorimotor systems make use, and Sem provides the 
meaning instructions of which the systems of thought make use. 
	 The expression Exp is generated by the operation Merge, which takes objects already 
constructed and constructs from them a new object. So, for example, Merge (X,Y) will yield 
the unordered set {X,Y}. The structure-building operation Merge follows the principle of 
Minimal Computation (compute and articulate as li]le as possible), for it is the simplest 
possible computational operation for the task at hand (Berwick & Chomsky 2016; Chomsky 
2016). There are two cases of Merge: External Merge refers to the operation where two 
syntactic objects are Merged but where neither one is part of the other. Internal Merge, on 
the other hand, refers to the operation where one of the syntactic objects is part of the other. 
For example, Internal Merge takes place when a syntactic object is combined with the set 
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that contains it: so if Merge (X,Y) yields Z={X,Y}, then Merge (Z,X) yields {X,Y{X}}. For 
concreteness, take the following simpliﬁed example of External Merge. The silver saucer broke 
yesterday is produced by Merge as follows: lexical items are Merged to (separately) create 
The, silver, and saucer. Then silver and saucer are Merged to create the Noun Phrase (NP) 
silver saucer. Then silver saucer is Merged with the to create the NP the silver saucer. Then that 
NP is combined with the Verb Phrase (VP) broke yesterday (which was produced by Merge 
when lexical items were Merged to create broke and lexical items were Merged to create 
yesterday, and then broke and yesterday were Merged together to create the VP broke yesterday). 
	 As for Internal Merge, suppose we Merged which saucer with John broke which saucer 
to produce which saucer John broke which saucer, which via further computations is then 
externalised as which saucer did John break. Before externalisation, there are two copies of the 
same linguistic object: the original one and the displaced one. They are both essential for 
interpretation. As Chomsky has remarked in various places when he discusses Merge, this is 
an example of the ubiquitous phenomenon of displacement in language, where phrases are 
heard in only one place but are interpreted both there and in another place. So we interpret 
the above sentence to mean “for which X, John broke the saucer X”. Merge, then, deﬁned as 
recursive set-formation, produces hierarchical structures and allows for the unbounded 
embedding of these structures (namely, it allows for discrete inﬁnity). 
	 What are Merged are of course not words but rather their properties, namely their 
syntactic features. It is features that are the building blocks of syntax and the way they 
combine and agree with each other shapes the way lexical items and phrases are structured. 
An important distinction in regard to features is that between interpretable features, which 
have an eﬀect on semantic interpretation, and uninterpretable features, which make no 
diﬀerence to the semantics of a sentence but are required for its syntax. In order for the 
semantic interface rules to apply, the syntactic operations must create a structure that has no 
uninterpretable features. This means that in the course of a syntactic derivation all 
uninterpretable features need to be eliminated, for if they are not then the derivation crashes 
and a complete semantic interpretation is not possible. As Adger and Svenonius (2011) 
discuss, the notion of feature matching is the driving force behind the establishment of 
syntactic dependencies. The presence of uninterpretable features forces feature matching 
and when this occurs each uninterpretable feature is deleted as it is matched with an 
interpretable feature. 
	 Let us look at a simpliﬁed concrete example of feature checking adapted from Adger 
(2003). Suppose we want to generate the VP kiss pigs. The word kiss[V,uN] has an 
interpretable feature [V], which is needed for its semantic interpretation as an event, and an 
uninterpretable feature [uN], which is needed for the syntax to determine the category of 
syntactic elements which will be able to Merge with kiss. In this case the feature determines 
that kiss can Merge with a lexical item that has [N] as one of its features. The word pig[N] 
has the interpretable feature [N] and can thus Merge with kiss. When kiss[V,uN] is Merged 
with pigs[N] to create the VP, the interpretable feature [N] is checked against the 
uninterpretable feature [uN] and the la]er is deleted. This derivational system determines 
the grammaticality of sentences based on whether a well-formed derivation can be 
constructed for them: this is done by feature checking. When the derivation crashes (i.e., 
when some uninterpretable features were not checked) an ungrammatical sentence results. 
Let us now look at how the derivational approach explains islands. 
	 Consider the following two sentences, again adapted from Adger (2003). 
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(15) I believed [DP the claim [CP that Philip would invade the city of Athens]].  
(16) *Which city do you believe [DP the claim [CP that Philip would invade]]? !
The reason why (16) is ungrammatical is that the complementiser phrase (CP) and 
determiner phrase (DP) are phases, which means that once constructed anything within 
these two categories is inaccessible for feature matching later in the derivation. Syntactic 
derivations are assumed to take place in cyclic steps called phases, and the Phase 
Impenetrability Condition stipulates that once a phase is complete any syntactic object 
within it is unavailable for further feature checking (Chomsky 2008). Thus, in (16) the 
uninterpretable wh-feature cannot match with the wh-expression and so the derivation 
crashes leading to an island eﬀect. This is because the DP is a phase and the Phase 
Impenetrability Condition means that the syntactic objects within it are unavailable for 
further feature matching. !
4 Islands reﬂect conditions on the output of the computational system 
There are two ways in which formal constraints can cause island phenomena. The ﬁrst was 
discussed in the previous section, which took constraints to apply to structure generation. 
What follows from this ﬁrst view is that “the constraint makes it impossible for speakers to 
construct mental representations that violate the constraint” (Phillips 2013: 158). An 
alternative, but still formal, account takes the constraints to “apply as a ﬁlter on generated 
structures, meaning that speakers are able to mentally represent structures that violate the 
constraint, but that they somehow also encode the fact that those representations are 
grammatically illicit” (Phillips 2013: 158, emphasis in original). Boeckx (2012) makes the 
distinction between pure syntax approaches and interface approaches. The la]er, “if they are 
to gain some traction (explanatory force), must appeal to properties of the external systems 
with which syntax interacts, and determine which of these properties lead to certain 
syntactic outputs to be judged illicit” (Boeckx 2012: 56).  
	 The pure syntax approach is problematic in light of what is known as island repair, 
where island structures do not lead to unacceptability when certain conditions are met. Ross 
(1967; 1969) showed early on that if certain conditions are met then islands do not 
necessarily lead to unacceptability. One type of island repair that has been extensively 
studied is what Ross (1969) termed “sluicing”, which is an ellipsis phenomenon in which the 
sentential part of a constituent question is elided, resulting in only the wh-phrase remaining. 
Compare (17) to (18), which are taken from Ross (1969: 252). !
(17) Ralph is going to invite somebody from Kankakee to the party, but they don’t know 
who he’s going to invite to the party. 
(18) Ralph is going to invite somebody from Kankakee to the party, but they don’t know 
who. !
As the contrast between (19) and (20) below shows, the wh-movement in sluicing is 
insensitive to islands. In other words, the relative clause island in (19) is repaired or 
circumvented by sluicing in (20) (see Merchant 2008 from which (19) and (20) are taken).  !
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(19) *They want to hire someone who speaks a Balkan language, but I don’t remember 
which they do. 
(20) They want to hire someone who speaks a Balkan language, but I don't remember which. !
Another type of island repair, also discussed by Ross, is resumption, where a resumptive 
pronoun is inserted where we would otherwise expect a gap to be: this resumptive pronoun 
repairs or circumvents the island, or at least makes the sentence more acceptable. Compare 
(21) and (22) below, taken from Asudeh (2004: 320). !
(21) *I’d like to meet the linguist that Peter knows a psychologist that works for _. 
(22) I’d like to meet the linguist that Peter knows a psychologist that works for her. !
	 Boeckx (2012: 79) remarks that island repair poses a problem not only for 
derivational approaches “but also for those accounts like Uriagereka’s [1999] that let 
interface considerations inﬂuence the course of syntactic derivations, for the two types of 
accounts are designed to prevent the island-violating extraction from taking place.” It is, 
says Boeckx, “a very serious puzzle for such approaches if it indeed turns out that the 
relevant extraction can be shown to have taken place, only to be legitimized by a 
subsequent, post-syntactic operation. How can something be repaired if it was never 
constructed in the ﬁrst place? How can something be legitimized in certain contexts if it is 
predicted never to happen in any context?” There are two related problems here: one is that 
island repair implies that movement from island domains can be done but that a subsequent 
operation like sluicing or resumption somehow hides this from the external systems 
interfacing with narrow syntax (thus allowing a sentence like (21) to be judged 
unacceptable). The other problem is that if movement from island domains cannot be done, 
so that no movement dependency can be established across a relative clause island as in (19), 
then a subsequent operation like sluicing appears to hide this fact from the external systems 
(thus allowing (20) to be judged as an acceptable sentence). 
	 It appears that a narrow syntax explanation of islands is problematic in light of 
island repair, at least if it is understood as the view that takes constraints to apply to 
structure generation alone. Returning to the aforementioned remark from Phillips (2013: 
158), what follows from the narrow syntax explanation of islands is that “the constraint 
makes it impossible for speakers to construct mental representations that violate the 
constraint.” However, island repair phenomena and perfectly thinkable thoughts are 
evidence that speakers can construct mental representations that violate island constraints. 
This is because many island sentences, whether unacceptable or repaired, are intelligible. In 
other words, as has been known for a long time, there is a disconnect between a speaker 
treating a structure as interpretable and treating that same structure as grammatically well-
formed. This suggests that island structures are generated in narrow syntax and are 
assigned an interpretation and that the unacceptable nature of island sentences arises from 
the interface with the sensory-motor systems. In other words, narrow syntax generates 
perfectly thinkable thoughts, but when the la]er are externalised via sound/sign then 
communication problems like island phenomena appear.  
	 Strictly speaking, then, one could say that there are no island phenomena at Sem 
because the generated structures are interpretable there but are uninterpretable or cause 
problems at Phon. “Bad” or unacceptable sentences are only “bad” at Phon, they cause no 
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problems at Sem. Notice that this is not the same as saying that since a sentence with an 
island is unacceptable but comprehensible, that implies that a “bad” or problematic sentence 
syntax was generated (so it’s not the case that a “bad” sentence was generated and then 
“ﬁxed” by island repair). I argue that there is no problem with the sentence’s syntax, for the 
thought it expresses via Sem is perfectly intelligible. The only problem that arises is when 
that thought is externalised in acts of communication. This is an important distinction. The 
structure is ﬁne for internal thought but causes problems for communication. I ﬂesh out this 
argument in the next section. But ﬁrst, let us see the details of the view that island 
constraints apply as an interface ﬁlter on generated structures. 
	 Recall that under the derivational account, islands are explained as a result of 
successive cyclic movement, as a result of the way in which syntactic derivations are 
computed in successive phases. The derivations that crash are ungrammatical or 
unacceptable but are “often used as literary devices and in informal discourse, with a precise 
and felicitous interpretation at the interfaces” (Chomsky 2008: 144). In other words, 
according to the derivational account, the derivation that has crashed is still transferred to 
the Sem and Phon interfaces where each interface must still assign the crashed derivation an 
interpretation. According to the interface account I outline below, however, narrow syntax 
allows the island-violating movement to occur (and hence the derivation does not crash) and 
so islands are due to operations that take place mostly, if not entirely, at the interfaces. It 
follows from the principle of Minimal Computation that “as soon as the information is 
transferred [to the interfaces] it will be forgo]en, not accessed in subsequent stages of 
derivation: the computation will not have to look back at earlier phases as it proceeds, and 
cyclicity is preserved in a very strong sense” (Chomsky 2008: 143). This is the 
aforementioned Phase Impenetrability Condition (PIC) which Boeckx (2012: 60-61) argues is 
both too strong and too weak. It is too strong because in light of island repair is does not 
oﬀer any escape hatch, and it is too weak because “once an escape hatch is provided, it 
becomes necessary to provide a restrictive theory of when this escape hatch can be 
exploited, for, otherwise, all opacifying (read: island-inducing) eﬀects of the PIC can be 
voided. Unfortunately, to this day, no such theory is available.” 
	 The solution oﬀered by Boeckx, which is of the kind I favour, is still very much a 
formal account and keeps most aspects of the narrow syntax account. The diﬀerence is in 
what is taken to follow from the principle of Minimal Computation. Boeckx (2012: 120, 
emphasis mine) explains: !
[…] islands are inevitable side-eﬀects of a grammatical system that is designed in 
such a way as to ensure, via cyclicity, an eﬃcient computation – one that seeks to 
reduce computational bo]lenecks such as multiple roots as soon as they arise. A 
side-eﬀect of immediately spelling out certain structures is that certain elements 
within these see their fates being sealed “too early.” Although nothing in syntax 
prevents these elements from moving, the external systems that receive early information 
about them take that information to be complete, and set these elements aside, 
eﬀectively turning them into islands. !
The way in which narrow syntax computes interpretable structures and the subsequent form 
in which these structures are then transferred to the interfaces at Spell-Out are the source of 
island phenomena. Notice that on this account narrow syntax freely generates perfectly 
 11
thinkable thoughts without recourse for externalisation and then interface operations at 
Phon determine whether the form of externalisation is acceptable or not in regard to islands. 
Boeckx believes that the problem with islands could be present at both interfaces. However, 
the presence of perfectly thinkable thoughts along with the language as an instrument of 
thought hypothesis oﬀer convincing evidence that the problem is mostly, if not entirely, at 
the Phon interface. Let us look at a speciﬁc proposal to this end. 
	 A key property at the Phon interface that creates islands is the need to convert 
hierarchical structures, which have no linear order, to structures that are linear and thus 
appropriate for externalisation. Kayne's (1994) inﬂuential account, according to which linear 
order is part of Phon and is derived from asymmetrical c-command relations, was the ﬁrst of 
several versions of an interface explanation of islands (see also Uriagereka 1999; 2011; Fox & 
Pesetsky 2005; Hornstein et al. 2007). According to Uriagereka’s (1999; 2011) interface 
account, complex syntactic units need to be linearised early on in the derivation and then 
returned to the syntax as if they were single, atomic lexical items. The claim is that this early 
Spell-Out and linearisation process leads to islands because once Spell-Out takes place the 
relevant units are unavailable for further computation. The linearisation process involves 
multiple applications of Spell-Out at Phon and turns successive parts of the derivation into 
islands. Hornstein et al. (2007) is another recent version of this so-called dynamic account. 
	 For concreteness, let us consider a simpliﬁed derivation, taken from Fox and 
Pesetsky (2005: 10ﬀ.). According to their account, when a domain is spelled out the 
linearisation instructions are added to an “ordering table”. Each new Spell-Out cycle adds 
new ordering information to the ordering table, which gives Phon information about the 
order of pronunciation. Suppose α merges with D to yield (23). !
(23) α[D X Y Z]  !
Spell-Out gives the ordering instructions to Phon as X precedes Y, and Y precedes Z (X<Y, 
Y<Z).  Now suppose that X undergoes leftward movement into a higher Spell-Out domain 4
D’ to yield (24). !
(24) [D’ … X α [D tx Y Z]] !
The linearisation of D’ now adds further ordering information to the ordering table. So in 
addition to X<Y and Y<Z we now also have X<α and α<D (meaning that α<Y). So the 
instructions in the ordering table are now: X<Y, Y<Z, X<α, α<Y. Notice that the ordering 
statements generated when D was spelled out are consistent with the ordering statements 
added when D’ was subsequently spelled out.  
	 Consider now an alternative scenario in which Y (instead of X) moves leftwards: !
(25) *[D’ … Y α [D X ty Z]] !
The instructions in the ordering table in this alternative scenario are: X<Y, Y<Z, Y<α, α<X. 
There is now a contradiction, for the original ordering statements generated when D was 
spelled out are not consistent with the new ordering statements added when Y moved 
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leftward. This is because the ﬁrst Spell-Out instructed Phon to pronounce X before Y, but the 
instructions at the subsequent Spell-Out instructed Phon to pronounce Y before X. That is, if 
α must be pronounced before X, and if X must be pronounced before Y, how can Y be 
pronounced before α? Islands are the result of such contradictions between sets of 
phonological instructions in the ordering table. This is because once information about 
linearisation is established at the end of a given Spell-Out domain (and sent to Phon as 
instructions for pronunciation), it cannot be deleted or altered in the course of subsequent 
Spell-Out operations. 
	 Notice that this dynamic account (as well as that of Uriagereka et al.) sees the need 
for linearisation at the Phon interface as inﬂuencing the course of the syntactic derivation, for 
the aim is to prevent island-violating movement from taking place. So in regard to (23), for 
example, Fox and Pesetsky argue that Y may not move leftwards out of D if it 
phonologically crosses X. There is thus a direct connection established between islands and 
the timing of Spell-Out. Boeckx (2012), on the other hand, argues that there is no strong 
theoretical reason to ban movement out of islands. Indeed, I think that we have good reason 
to suppose that movement is allowed, for if island structures are interpretable (and given 
that language is an instrument of thought) the structures must have been generated in 
narrow syntax. 
	 Another way to put the ma]er is as follows. There is nothing in the syntax that 
produces problematic structures such as islands. Rather, the problems only appear when the 
structures are sent to Phon for linearisation and externalisation. This is compatible with 
language being an instrument of thought because the way in which structures are generated 
by narrow syntax are perfectly interpretable at Sem but cause problems at Phon. Islands 
cannot be due to constraints on structure generation at narrow syntax because if this was the 
case then narrow syntax could not supply Sem a structure rich enough for interpretation that 
islands clearly make available.  I argue that we can keep the account where islands are due 5
to a contradiction of phonological instructions at Spell-Out and also hold that movement is 
allowed out of islands. The la]er explains why we can interpret island sentences, and the 
former explains why we ﬁnd them unacceptable.  
	 The aim of minimalism is to examine “every device (principle, idea, etc.) that is 
employed in characterizing languages to determine to what extent it can be eliminated in 
favor of a principled account in terms of general conditions of computational eﬃciency and 
the interface condition that the organ must satisfy for it to function at all” (Chomsky 2004: 
106). Therefore, any account that reduces islands to interface conditions as much as possible 
is to be preferred. The dynamic account retains elements of the derivational account in that 
constraints from the external systems inﬂuence structure generation. But the account I 
suggest goes further by claiming that islands are mostly, if not entirely, a product of 
externalisation at Phon, leaving narrow syntax to freely generate structures that are perfectly 
interpretable at Sem. In other words, in order to be usable at all by the sensorimotor systems, 
the structures generated by narrow syntax must be linearised, for telepathy and speaking in 
structures are of course unavailable. If islands could be shown to be a by-product of 
linearisation, leaving narrow syntax to generate structures freely, that would go a long way 
to satisfying the aims of the minimalist program. In addition, if it could be shown that 
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perfectly thinkable thoughts are interpretable for reasons having to do with computational 
eﬃciency at the Sem interface, then that would strengthen the case for island phenomena 
being due to constraints that exist, perhaps entirely, at the interface at Phon. I suggest in the 
next section how this can be done. I argue that the biolinguistic understanding of language 
as an instrument of thought oﬀers an independent reason in support of the interface 
account. !
5 The asymmetry of the interfaces 
As mentioned above, the structure-building operation Merge follows the principle of 
Minimal Computation, for it is the simplest possible computational operation for the task at 
hand. There are independent reasons to believe that cognitive processes satisfy the principle 
of Minimal Computation (Cherniak 1994; Cherniak et al. 2002; Chomsky 2016), and since 
Merge satisﬁes this principle and is able to account for the underlying mechanisms of 
language, we have strong grounds for its existence as a core computational principle of 
human language. We saw above that islands cannot be due to constraints on structure 
generation alone, for they are perfectly thinkable thoughts, and if that is the case then that 
gives weight to the interface account of islands. We have structures that create problems for 
communication but that are necessary for interpretation at Sem. There is thus an asymmetry 
between the interfaces in favour of the semantic side, pushing externalisation via Phon to the 
periphery.  
	 Another way to put the ma]er is as follows. The Sem interface is practically uniform 
among languages, but the Phon interface is of course diﬀerent for each language. That is, the 
structures generated at Sem are the same for all languages, for all humans are able to think 
the same kinds of thought, but those structures are externalised via Phon in diﬀerent ways. 
The design of language, then, favours minimal computation at Sem, often at the expense of 
ease of communication (Sigurðsson 2004; Burton-Roberts 2011; Asoulin 2016). If one takes 
the biolinguistic understanding of language as an instrument of thought then the existence 
of islands follows from the normal application of the generative procedures of the language 
faculty. The problem with island structures only arises when the structures are externalised; 
these structures are not problematic for internal thoughts.  The upshot is that the structure 6
and content of lexical and phrasal meanings are composed independently of how or 
whether they are to be communicated. 
	 There is a suite of arguments that support the claim that language is an instrument of 
thought (Hinzen 2006; 2013; Burton-Roberts 2011; Chomsky 2013; 2013a; Asoulin 2016), let 
us now see what the claim amounts to in detail. Linguistic expressions provide a perspective 
(in the form of a conceptual structure) on the world, for it is only via language that certain 
perspectives are available to us and to our thought processes. This is in line with a long 
rationalist tradition in the philosophy of language and linguistics (Chomsky 1966), most 
famously articulated by Humboldt in the nineteenth century, according to which language 
provides humans with a Weltansicht or worldview that allows us to form the concepts with 
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the same generative procedure that produces perfectly thinkable thoughts at Sem, but these thoughts are 
externalised in diﬀerent ways in diﬀerent languages via Phon. So the same thought externalised in one language 
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is diﬀerent but the Sem is the same. Though note that cross-linguistic variation in islands is quite limited (see 
Phillips 2013: 9ﬀ for discussion and references).
which we think certain kinds of thought (but, crucially, not all kinds of thought: for we share 
many kinds of thought processes with animals that do not have language).  
	 In his study of Humboldt, Underhill (2009) remarks that Humboldt’s “rich and 
dynamic model of language” is one “in which the individual both shapes and is shaped by 
the organ of speech” (Underhill 2009: xi, emphasis in original). The worldview concept of 
Weltansicht, which forms the cornerstone of Humboldt’s linguistic philosophy, is understood 
as “the conﬁguration of concepts which allow conceptual thought” of a certain kind 
(Underhill 2009: 56). Language is an instrument of thought in this sense, but note that this is 
not a Whorﬁan claim of linguistic determinism, for thought is certainly independent of 
language, and what can be expressed or thought by a speaker of one language can certainly 
be expressed or thought by a speaker of a very diﬀerent language. As Underhill (2009: 57) 
remarks, Whorﬁan claims are merely “weak echoes of Humboldt’s voice”. Language 
provides us with a unique way of thinking and talking about the world that is unavailable to 
non-linguistic animals. Though of course animals have thoughts of many kinds (many of 
which are shared with humans), but since they lack the language faculty there is a speciﬁc 
kind of thought that they lack (Rogers & Hauser 2010; Hinzen 2013; Asoulin 2019). Let us 
see how this rationalist understanding of the role of language in cognition is manifested in 
current biolinguistics. 
	 Any theory of Sem must satisfy three basic conditions of adequacy, so that in order to 
capture what the language faculty determines about the meaning of an expression, Sem must 
“be universal, in that any thought expressible in a human language is representable in it; an 
interface, in that these representations have an interpretation in terms of other systems of the 
mind/brain involved in thought, referring, planning, and so on; and uniform” (Chomsky 
1995: 21). Sem must be uniform “for all languages, so as to capture all and only the 
properties of the system of language as such” (Chomsky 1995: 21). Note the stress on all and 
only the properties of the system of language: the language faculty allows humans to use 
available concepts (some of which are shared with other animals) to introduce formally new 
concepts. The claim is not that Sem is the interface of all conceptual content or of all of 
thought.  
	 Pietroski (2008; 2010; 2018) has developed one of the most interesting and detailed 
accounts of this internalist semantics, the leading idea of which is that “in the course of 
language acquisition, humans use available concepts to introduce formally new concepts that 
can be fetched via lexical items and combined via certain operations that are invoked by the 
human faculty of language” (Pietroski 2010: 247, emphasis in original). That is, meanings are 
(internal, and unconscious) instructions for how to access and assemble concepts of a special 
sort. Meaning is here understood not in an extensional sense but rather in terms of the 
cognitive resources (the computational procedures) that humans deploy in generating the 
meanings. To put the ma]er in Pietroski’s terms, already existing concepts (many of which 
we share with other animals) are lexicalised and in the process distinctively new concepts 
are produced that we are then able to combine to form linguistic expressions. Just as the 
formally new concepts are not a mere concatenation of their constituents, the linguistic 
expressions generated are also distinctively new in a way that is not a mere concatenation of 
their constituent concepts. This process of lexicalisation and structure-building, the product 
of which are perfectly thinkable thoughts, is unique to humans and is part of the explanation 
of the creative aspect of language use (Chomsky 1966; McGilvray 2001; 2005; Asoulin 2013). 
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	 In order to ﬂesh out the idea that lexicalisation is the process by which pre-existing 
concepts are used to introduce formally new concepts, Pietroski moves away from the 
Fregean idea that combining expressions is an instruction to saturate a concept and towards 
a Conjunctivist account of linguistic composition (Hornstein & Pietroski 2009; Pietroski 
2018). According to the la]er account, lexicalisation is not a process in which a previously 
available concept is merely labelled using a lexical item that inherits its content from the 
concept itself. Rather, lexicalisation is a device for accessing previously available concepts 
which become lexical items that are used as input to I-language operations that combine the 
lexical items in speciﬁc ways to introduce new formally distinct concepts. Accordingly, the 
Sem of any expression Exp = 〈Phon, Sem〉 is not a concept that is paired with a pronunciation. 
Indeed, as Pietroski puts it, “evaluating SEMs as if they were concepts may be a category 
mistake, like evaluating an instruction to fetch a rabbit as male or female” (Pietroski 2010: 252, 
emphasis in original). So a Sem is an instruction to fetch (i.e., lexicalise) a previously 
available concept that is then used to build a formally new concept(s). This formally new 
concept will be stored in the mind somehow (and perhaps be recombined with other 
concepts to create yet more formally new concepts), but the Sem itself is not a concept.  
	 Another way to put the ma]er is as follows. Humans possess a great variety of pre-
lexical mental representations (many of which we share with other animals). On the 
Conjunctivist account, these pre-lexical mental representations are linked to formally 
distinct but analytically similar concepts. The la]er are sometimes referred to as I-concepts 
(Jackendoﬀ 1989; 1990) to signal that the way in which these concepts are to be studied is on 
the model of the study of language signalled by the use of I-language as opposed to E-
language. Thus, “the repertoire of I-concepts expressed by sentences cannot be mentally 
encoded as a list, but must be characterized in terms of a ﬁnite set of mental primitives and a 
ﬁnite set of principles of mental combination that collectively describe the set of possible I-
concepts expressed by sentences” (Jackendoﬀ 1990: 9). I-concepts, then, generate a uniquely 
human subset of concepts that humans can use to think about the world. The internalist 
semantics claim is that understanding an expression of I-language (or perceiving its 
meaning) is a ma]er of (unconsciously) recognising that that expression is an instruction to 
construct concepts of a special kind. This explanation of meaning also oﬀers an explanation 
for the creative aspect of language use, for it sheds light on the computational procedure by 
which we combine concepts in recursively productive ways to yield formally new concepts. 
Notice again that this biolinguistic understanding of meaning does not focus on 
externalisation. The interpretable structures are generated in a way that is optimal at Sem 
but that is often problematic at Phon. 
	 To recap, what follows from the above understanding of language as an instrument 
of thought in regard to islands? What can we conclude from the understanding of language 
as providing humans with a Weltansicht or worldview that allows us to form the concepts 
with which we think certain kinds of thought? The unacceptable island structures that are 
interpretable must have been generated in narrow syntax (for they are perfectly thinkable 
thoughts), and this suggests that island phenomena are not due to constraints on structure 
generation but rather due to the mapping of perfectly thinkable thoughts to the Phon 
interface. That is, the a]empt to externalise perfectly thinkable thoughts leads to 
communication problems and depending on the I-language of the speaker/hearer the 
externalisation might lead to island phenomena.  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